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Parallel enforcement and accountability: the case of EU competition law 
 




Competition law has been a fundamental area of EU law ever since the establishment of the 
Treaties of Rome in 1957.1 EU competition law consists of specific substantive rules, such as 
the prohibition of anti-competitive agreements and abuse of a dominant position (Articles 101 
and 102 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)), as well as procedural 
rules laid down in Regulation 1/2003 and various soft law instruments. While the 
Commission had a central role in the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU until 2004, 
this was fundamentally changed by Regulation 1/2003 in 2004,2 which delegated 
enforcement powers to national competition authorities (NCAs) and national courts in order 
to relieve the Commission of its increasing administrative burden and make enforcement 
more effective. Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003 imposed an obligation on NCAs to apply 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in parallel with their national competition rules when ‘effect on 
trade between Member States’ can be established. 
Accordingly, EU competition law is today enforced by the EU Commission and 28 
NCAs, in a multi-level governance system composed of EU and national procedural laws. 
The NCAs and Commission have concurrent jurisdictions and there are neither territorial 
limitations to their enforcement powers nor a prohibition of parallel proceedings between the 
Commission under EU law and the NCAs under national law.3 In order to coordinate parallel 
proceedings between the Commission and the NCAs, Regulation 1/2003 established the 
European Competition Network (ECN) and laid down the rules of its core functions – case 
allocation and information sharing – in the so-called Network Notice.4 Hence Regulation 
1/2003 created an enforcement system of parallel competences, in which a specific case can 
be dealt with either by a single NCA with or without the assistance of authorities from other 
                                                                 
1
 The Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom in 1957 were signed by Belgium, France, Germany, 
Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands in Rome and are therefore also referred to as the Treaties of 
Rome.  
2
 Council Regulation (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty [2003] OJ L1/1. 
3
 R Nazzini, ‘Fundamental Rights Beyond Legal Positivism: Rethinking the ne bis in idem Principle 
in EU Competition Law’ [2014] 2 Journal of Antitrust Enforcement 270, 275. 
4
 Commission Notice on cooperation within the Network of Competition Authorities [2004] OJ 
C101/43 (Network Notice). 
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Member States, by several NCAs acting in parallel, or by the Commission acting on its own. 
It is this parallel enforcement system where the Commission and the NCAs share the 
enforcement of EU competition rules which will be investigated in this chapter. 
In light of the focus of this book, this chapter analyses the shared enforcement of EU 
competition law from a political and judicial accountability perspective. Due to the particular 
function and organisation of shared enforcement of EU competition law, the chapter focuses 
on the accountability of the Commission and of the NCAs as well as the ECN as the main 
actors of the shared enforcement. We use two jurisdictions to illustrate the role and powers of 
the NCAs: the Netherlands and Hungary. Section 2 analyses the powers and roles of the three 
respective actors (the Commission, the NCAs and the ECN) of the parallel enforcement, 
section 3 examines judicial and political accountability and section 4 presents a conclusion.  
 
2. The system of parallel enforcement of EU competition law  
 
2.1 Powers of the Commission 
 
Regulation 1/2003 strengthened the Commission’s investigatory powers and remedial 
powers,5 and it extended its search and evidence collecting powers. Accordingly, the 
Commission has powers to execute all the stages of public enforcement: monitoring, 
investigation and sanctioning as laid down in Regulation 1/2003 (Articles 17–25).  
Article 17 of Regulation 1/2003 is an important power regarding monitoring. On the 
basis of Article 17, the Commission can conduct sector inquiries about the functioning of 
specific markets.6 The Commission starts a sector inquiry ‘when it believes that a market is 
not working as well as it should, and also believes that breaches of the competition rules 
might be a contributory factor’.7 
The Commission has broad investigative powers under Regulation 1/2003, such as the 
power to request information (art 18), the power to take statements (art 19), the power to 
                                                                 
5 
Art 20 of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission to seal premises for the period and to the 
extent necessary for the inspection. Art 21 of Regulation 1/2003 empowers the officials authorised by 
the Commission to enter non-business premises when there is a reasonable suspicion that books and 
other records relevant for the inspection are being kept there. This power will be exercised only where 
the suspected violation is serious and will be exercised under the control of national courts. Art 7(1) 
of Regulation 1/2003 enables the imposition of structural remedies and art 9 of Regulation 1/2003 
grants the Commission the power to accept commitments from the parties under investigation in arts 
101 and 102 procedures and to make these commitments binding. 
6
 See in general on this topic E Lachnit, Alternative Enforcement of Competition law (Eleven 
International Publishing 2016).  
7
 See <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/sector_inquiries.html> accessed 4 November 2016. 
inspect business premises (art 20) and the power to inspect private premises (art 21).8 The 
power to request information consists of two types of requests for information, namely simple 
requests (art 18(2)) and requests by decision (art 18(3)). The difference between the two 
options is that for the latter an answer is compulsory under threat of an administrative fine, 
while for the first option only wrong or misleading information can be sanctioned.9 
Regulation 1/2003 provides three types of investigations for the Commission: inspections of 
business premises based on an authorisation from the DG Competition under Article 20(3) 
(announced inspections), inspections of business premises by formal Commission decision 
under Article 20(4) (unannounced inspections) and inspections of private premises by formal 
Commission decision combined with a national judicial authorisation under Article 21.10 
Under Article 20(5), the NCA of the Member State in whose territory the Commission 
inspection is to be conducted is obliged to actively assist the Commission during the 
inspection at the request of the Commission. According to paragraph 6 of the same article, 
the NCA must request the assistance of the police or of an equivalent enforcement authority 
if the Commission finds that an undertaking opposes the inspection ordered. The NCA must 
also guarantee judicial authorisation if this is required according to the national rules.11  
Judicial review of this act by the national courts is limited to the arbitrariness and 
excessiveness of the coercive measures.12 The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) confirmed 
in Roquette Frères13 and subsequent case law14 that only the EU courts have the competence 
to rule on the lawfulness of the inspection, which includes the necessity of the inspection and 
the adequacy of the reasons submitted by the Commission.15 The authorisation of the national 
court in whose territory the inspection is conducted is necessary when the investigation 
concerns private premises. The judicial control of the national courts in this case is also 
limited to the arbitrariness and excessiveness of the coercive measures.16 The Commission 
can request one of the NCAs to conduct the inspection on behalf of the Commission under 
Article 22(2). The NCAs are obliged to conduct the requested inspection and they do so on 
the basis of their national procedural law when exercising these powers.  
                                                                 
8
 See J Faull and A Nikpay, The EU Law of Competition (OUP 2014) 1135–222. 
9
 Reg 1/2003, art 23(1). 
10
 Faull and Nikpay (n 8) 1173.  
11
 Reg 1/2003, art 20(7). This is for example the case in the United Kingdom.  
12
 Faull and Nikpay (n 8) 1179 and 1208–9. 
13
 Case C-94/00 Roquette Frères [2002] ECR I-9011, para 47.  
14
 Case C-37/13 P Nexans and Nexans France v Commission [2014] EU:C:2014:2030, para 34; Case 
C-583/13 P Deutsche Bahn v Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:C:2015:404. 
15
 Faull and Nikpay (n 8) 1179 and 1208–9. 
16
 Reg 1/2003, art 21(3). 
The undertaking can directly dispute the legality of the decisions ordering the 
inspection at the CJEU in an action for annulment under Article 263 TFEU. The use of 
evidence collected during the inspection can be disputed in an appeal against the fining 
decision. The CJEU ruled in Orkem that the undertaking has an obligation to actively 
cooperate during the investigation phase.17 This obligation requires that the undertaking 
‘must make all information relating to the subject matter of the investigation available to the 
Commission’.18 The infringement of fundamental rights, such as the right against self-
incrimination, is the limit of the duty to cooperate.19 Article 23 prescribes that non-
cooperation for these investigative powers can result in sanctions, except for non-cooperation 
in case of inspections of private premises under Article 21. The undertaking can file an 
appeal for annulment against these fines at the CJEU (art 263 TFEU). 
After the investigation phase, the Commission will decide whether a fine should be 
imposed or whether another remedy such as a commitment decision – in which case the 
undertaking promises to change its behaviour but no infringement is established – should be 
used.20 If the Commission decides that a fine should be imposed, the Commission drafts a 
statement of objection in which the Commission describes the suspected infringement and the 
basis for this suspicion.21 The undertaking has the right to give its view on this statement of 
objection and has the right to be heard by the independent hearing officer.22 After the hearing, 
the Commission makes a draft decision which will be sent to the Advisory Committee, which 
consists of representatives of the NCAs, after which the final decision will follow.23 The 
undertaking can file an appeal against the final decision at the General Court with the 
possibility of further appeal at the CJEU.24 
The Commission has a wide margin of discretion throughout the whole procedure, 
starting with setting priorities i.e. which cases it will investigate and whether a sanction will 
be imposed or not or whether a commitment decision is taken.25 The Commission can start an 
investigation ex officio or upon a third-party complaint. The third party whose complaint is 
rejected by the Commission, in other words the Commission decides not to investigate the 
                                                                 
17
 Case C-374/87 Orkem [1989] ECR 3283, para 27. 
18
 Ibid.; Faull and Nikpay (n 8) 1145.  
19
 Ibid.  
20
 Reg 1/2003, art 9. 
21
 Reg 773/2004, art 10. 
22
 Ibid., arts 10(2), (3), and 11. 
23
 Reg 1/2003, art 14. 
24
 Ibid., art 31. 
25
 J Mendes, ‘Discretion, Care and Public Interests in the EU Administration: Probing the Limits of 
Law’ (2016) 53 CMLR 419. 
case, can file an appeal at the CJEU under Article 263 TFEU.26 The third party can also file 
an appeal where the Commission decides to make a commitment decision instead of a fining 
decision.27  
 
2.2 Powers of the NCAs  
 
Article 35 of Regulation 1/2003 states that each Member State has to designate a NCA 
responsible for the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. As a consequence of the 
principle of institutional autonomy, the Member States are free to design their own 
enforcement system.28 The designated NCAs could, therefore, be administrative or judicial in 
nature. The Member States were obliged to set up a sanctioning system providing for 
sanctions which are effective, proportionate and dissuasive for infringements of EU law.29 
The Regulation does not set any formal requirements concerning the internal organisation of 
the NCAs in relation to their independence. However, political independence of the NCAs 
has received considerable attention in recent policy documents.30 EU law has, in other fields 
of economic regulation, focused on the independence of national regulatory agencies from 
market players,31 However, while EU law is considerably detailed concerning the concept of 
independence and the EU Courts emphasised the importance of independence in the context 
of regulated markets,32 the Courts have, so far, not formulated general principles on the 
independence of regulatory authorities.33 Accordingly, while EU law requires regulators to be 
                                                                 
26
 See also K Cseres and J Mendes, ‘Consumers’ Access to EU Competition Procedures: Outer and 
Inner Limits’ (2014) 51 CMLR 483. 
27
 Case C-441/07 Alrosa [2009] ECR I-05949. 
28
 See on this topic M Scholten and A Ottow, ‘Institutional Design of Enforcement in the EU: the 
Case of Financial Markets’ (2014) 10(5) ULR 80. 
29
 Point 2 Network Notice (n 4). See also Case C-176/03 Commission of the European Communities v 
Council of the European Union [2005] ECR I-7879, paras 46–55. 
30 
European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document – Enhancing competition 
enforcement by the MS' competition authorities: institutional and procedural issues (European 
Commission 2014), available at 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/legislation/swd_2014_231_en.pdf> accessed 5 November 
2016 
31
 It was in 1988, in Directive 88/301 on competition in the markets in telecommunications terminal 
equipment that the Commission introduced in art 6 an obligation on the Member States to entrust the 
regulation of terminal equipment to a body independent from market parties active in the provision of 
telecoms services or equipment. This requirement of independence has also been implemented in the 
second liberalisation package in the energy and telecoms sector.  
32 
See Case C-202/88 France v Commission [1991] ECR I-1223, paras 51–52; Case C-18/88 RTT v 
GB-Inno-BM [1991] ECR I-5973, paras 25–26; Case C-82/07 Comisión del Mercado de las 
Telecomunicaciones [2009] ECR I-1265.  
33 
The latest package of liberalisation Directives of 2009 mentions a general principle of independence 
independent from political institutions, it has not laid down the criteria of independence that 
regulatory authorities must meet.34 Correspondingly, Regulation 1/2003 does not specify any 
sort of requirements on the formal independence of NCAs.35 Guidi’s study on the 
independence of NCAs shows a large variation across Member States concerning 
institutional, personal and financial independence from central governments.36 The 
Commission has recently started to plead for more independence for NCAs in order to 
enhance further the enforcement of EU competition law.37 Article 4 of the recently proposed 
Directive on empowering NCAs38 lays down detailed requirements on the independence of 
the NCAs from both political as well as market parties. At the same time, the proposed 
Directive obliges Member States to subject NCAs to proportionate accountability 
requirements as will be explained in section 3.1.. 
As mentioned above, Article 3(1) of Regulation 1/2003 imposes an obligation on the 
NCAs and national courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU in parallel with their national 
prohibitions when effect on trade between Member States is at stake.39 Article 3(2) of the 
Regulation encapsulates the supremacy rule of EU law and the EU interpretation of Article 
101 TFEU. Stricter national cartel prohibitions are allowed, as long as these do not apply to 
agreements, concerted practices and decisions of associations of undertakings that may fall 
within the jurisdictional scope of the EU competition rules. In practice, a high degree of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
towards the legislative and executive organs. Art 35 of Directive 2009/72 on electricity compels 
Member States to make the regulatory authority ‘functionally independent from any other public or 
private entity’ and give it the autonomy to decide ‘independently of any public body’. Art 39 of 
Directive 2009/73 for gas formulates the same obligation. Directive 2009/140 on electronic 
communications states that ‘national regulatory authorities responsible for ex-ante market regulation 
or for the resolution of disputes between undertakings’ (…) ‘shall act independently and shall not seek 
or take instructions from any other body in relation to the exercise of these tasks assigned to them 
under national law implementing Community law’.  
34 C Hanretty, P Larouche and A Reindl, ‘Independence, Accountability and Perceived Quality of 
Regulators’ (CERRE Report 2012). 
35
 Case C-53/03 Syfait [2005] ECR I-04609, paras 31–36. 
36
 The most recent and comprehensive study on the issue of the formal independence of NCAs is the 
work of Guidi who shows extensive variations in independence among the NCAs. However, Guidi’s 
study raises the question of how an NCA’s de iure independence reflects its de facto independence. 
Mattia Guidi, ‘Delegation and Varieties of Capitalism: Explaining the Independence of National 
Competition Agencies in the European Union’ (2014) 12 CEL 343-365.  
37
 European Commission (n 30).  
38
 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, COM (2017)0142 final. 
39
 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper of 29 April 2009 accompanying the 
Report on the functioning of Regulation 1/2003  (SEC 2009), paras 141–142 and 152. Supremacy of 
EU competition law over national competition law has been established by Case C-14/68 Walt 
Wilhelm v Bundeskartellamt [1969] ECR I-0001, but only for cases where an exemption under art 
101(3) has been granted. See also more recently Case C-17/10 Toshiba [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:72. 
Europeanisation of competition laws exists due to the fact that most national competition 
laws mirror the European prohibitions.40  
Regulation 1/2003 contains some basic rules on the powers of the NCAs. Article 5 
lists the types of decisions which the NCAs can take when they apply Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU: finding an infringement; ordering interim measures; accepting commitments and 
imposing fines. The strict interpretation of Article 5 leads to the conclusion that the NCAs are 
not empowered to establish the non-infringement of Articles 101 or 102 TFEU as the General 
Court ruled in Tele2Polska.41  
Regulation 1/2003 does not regulate the procedural rules to be followed by the 
NCAs.42 This means that the NCAs apply the same substantive rules, but act on the basis of 
different procedural laws. This approach respects the procedural autonomy of the Member 
States.43 This freedom is, however, not unlimited. This procedural autonomy finds its 
limitations in the principles of equivalence and effectiveness.44 Another limitation can be 
found in Article 4(3) TEU which requires the Member States to take all appropriate measures 
to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising from the EU Treaty and facilitate the 
achievement of the EU’s tasks. The newly proposed Directive on empowering NCAs puts 
forward rules that could enhance the effectiveness of NCAs when they enforce EU 
competition law rules.45 The proposed rules address independence and resources of the 
NCAs, decision-making and investigative powers, the issuing of fines, a common set of 
leniency conditions and mutual assistance. If the Directive is approved and implemented, it 
can form a major step in harmonizing the currently diverging procedural rules of public 
enforcement.  
In current practice, the procedural rules differ among the Member States for the 
different stages of enforcement (monitoring, investigation and sanctioning (see Chapter 1)), 
for judicial review, as well as for the ability of NCAs to formally set enforcement priorities.46 
                                                                 
40
 European Commission, Pilot field study on the functioning of the national judicial systems for the 
application of competition law rules (2014). 
41
 Case C-375/09 Tele2 Polska [2011] ECR I-03055. 
42 
European Commission (n 39).  
43
 Case C-68/88 Greek Maiz [1989] ECR I- 02965. 
44
 Case C-439/08 VEBIC [2010] ECR I- 12471. 
45
 Proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to empower the competition 
authorities of the Member States to be more effective enforcers and to ensure the proper functioning 
of the internal market, COM (2017)0142 final. See on the effective national enforcement by the 
NCAs: A Outhuijse, The shared enforcement of antitrust cases: effectivity difficulties at the national 
level, <http://eulawenforcement.com/?p281#more-281> accessed 19 July 2017. 
46
 ECN’s Working Group on cooperation issues and due process monitors this voluntary convergence 
among the Member States. Individual Reports provide an overview of the different systems and 
These differences may have far-reaching consequences in the enforcement of Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, such as the difference between monetary and custodial sanctions. In some 
Member States custodial sanctioning for natural persons and liability of associations of 
undertakings is possible, while in others it is not.47  
Similar to the Commission, most NCAs have the competence to conduct market 
inquiries although their market scans are limited to their national territory.48 The NCAs’ 
specific investigative powers depend on the respective procedural framework, but are in 
general quite similar to the investigative powers of the Commission.49 For example, the 
Netherlands Authority for Consumer and Markets (ACM) has the power to request 
information, power to take statements, and power to inspect business and private premises.50 
Undertakings investigated by the ACM also have to cooperate under the threat of 
sanctioning.51 Likewise, the Hungarian Competition Authority (Gazdasági Versenyhivatal 
(GVH)) has the following investigative measures when it acts during competition 
proceedings: request for information; hearing of witnesses; access to documents; on-site 
inspection without prior notification, based on a judicial authorisation, at business and private 
premises; seizure; sealing; or the making of forensic images of a computer database.52 The 
undertaking also has the duty to cooperate.53  
In most Member States, the NCA has the possibility to impose a fine after the 
investigations phase, and this is the case both in the Netherlands and in Hungary.54 In the 
Netherlands, the department that imposes the fine is separated from the department that 
conducts the investigations. Article 12q of the Dutch Establishment Act ACM requires the 
ACM not to involve the persons investigating an infringement in the decision-making 
concerning the fine. An infringement of this article leads to the annulment of the fine if the 
fining decision is appealed in court.55 The decision-making department has full discretion to 
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
procedures for antitrust investigations within the ECN (2012) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html> accessed 12 November 2016. 
47
 See on this topic P Whelan, ‘Criminal Antitrust Enforcement and Procedural Fairness’ in C Nagy 
(ed), The Procedural Aspects of the Application of Competition Law (Europa Law Publishing 2016). 
48
 ECN, Results of the questionnaire on the reform of Member States national competition laws after 
Commission Regulation No. 1/2003 (2008) 7.  
49
 Ibid., 2–8.  
50
 ACM Establishment Act (EAA), arts 12a–12g. 
51
 EAA, art 12m. 
52
 Hungarian Competition Act (HCA), sections 55, 55/A, 65, and 65/A(1).  
53
 HCA, section 64/B(1). See also C Nagy, ‘Administrative Competition Procedure and Judicial 
Review in Hungary’ in Nagy (n 47) 192–204. 
54
 This is not the case in Austria, Ireland, Denmark, Finland and Sweden. 
55
 District Court Rotterdam 28 April 2004, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2004:BI3337 (ETB Vos).  
decide whether it will impose a fine, although ACM’s board has the final responsibility and 
imposes the fine officially.56 The investigation and decision-making powers are also 
separated within the GVH. The decision-making body of the GVH is the Competition 
Council (CC) which is under the management of one of the Vice Presidents of the GVH who 
is at the same time the Chair of the CC. The CC is a quasi-judicial body and it decides each 
case in a three-member (exceptionally five-member) panel designated by the Chair of the CC 
and its members act with full autonomy. They cannot be given instructions and they are 
subordinated only to the law. The members of the CC are lawyers or economists (or have 
both qualifications). There must be at least one economist among the members of the 
decision panel for every case.57 
As mentioned above, the possible addressees of the fine vary among the Member 
States. In the Netherlands, an administrative fine can be imposed on undertaking or groups of 
undertakings, associations of undertakings and individuals within the undertakings. Although 
custodial sanctions for individuals are gaining ground in many Member States due to the 
considered deterrent effects of such sanctions,58 the Netherlands decided not to introduce this 
type of sanction in the Dutch system. In contrast, criminal punishments are applied in 
Hungary in antitrust cases regarding public procurement and concessional cartels.59 In these 
procedures, it is not the GVH which conducts the investigations but the Public Prosecutor’s 
Office in cooperation with the police, and the criminal court is the decision-making judicial 
entity.60 Natural persons involved in these cartels may face imprisonment of up to five 
years.61 
In all Member States, the fining decision of the NCA or court can be appealed and 
reviewed at (another) court. The national competition law systems differ on the types and 
numbers of court instances, the time limits, the burden of proof and the scope and intensity of 
judicial review. The relevant factors for judicial accountability will be described in section 
3.2.  
The NCAs have broad discretion in the decision to investigate a certain case and to 
                                                                 
56
 General Administrative Law Act, art 5:51.  
57
 OECD, Roundtable on changes in institutional design of competition authorities, note by Hungary 
(2014) DAF/COMP/WD(2014)123.  
58
 See Whelan (n 47); K Ost, ‘From Regulation 1 to Regulation 2: National Enforcement of EU Cartel 
Prohibition and the Need For Further Convergence’ (2014) 5 JECLP 125. Imprisonment is for 
example possible in the UK, Estonia, Ireland and Denmark.  
59
 C Nagy, Competition Law in Hungary (Wolters Kluwer 2016) 139. 
60
 Ibid., 145.  
61
 Ibid., 140.  
impose a fine. Both the ACM and the GVH may set priorities and are not obliged to 
investigate all alleged violations of competition law. According to Article 70(1) Hungarian 
Competition Act, the GVH only has the obligation to start an investigation if the protection of 
the public interest warrants it, but has a margin of appreciation to decide when this 
requirement is fulfilled. The decision not to investigate a case both in the Netherlands62 and 
in Hungary63 can be appealed in court if the case was started on the basis of a complaint by a 
third party. The courts only conduct a marginal review in those kinds of cases because of the 
discretion of the competition authority in these areas.64  
 
2.3 Coordination Mechanisms  
 
Regulation 1/2003 envisages mechanisms of close cooperation, regarding information 
exchange and case allocation, between all competition authorities in the European Union. The 
ECN (European Competition Network) has been established as a framework for these 
mechanisms. The rules regarding communications between ECN authorities are laid down in 
Regulation 1/2003 and in the Network Notice.65 From the outset, it was made clear that ‘all 
competition authorities are independent from one another and that cooperation takes place on 
the basis of equality, respect and solidarity’, as stated in point 7 of the Joint Statement of the 
Council and the Commission on the Functioning of the Network of Competition Authorities 
which was adopted along with Regulation 1/2003. 
Articles 11, 12, 15 and 16 of Regulation 1/2003 address the parallel enforcement 
between the Commission and the national authorities. These articles show that, although the 
objective is equality between the different enforcers, the Commission acts as primus inter 
pares when it comes to the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. According to Article 
11(6) of Regulation 1/2003, the initiation by the Commission of proceedings for the adoption 
of a fining decision relieves the NCAs of their competence to apply Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU in the same case. The commitment decision forms an exception, since commitment 
decisions adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of the NCAs to apply Articles 
                                                                 
62
 District Court Rotterdam 13 August 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:5805 (Brink); District Court 
Rotterdam 27 August 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:6080 (Buma/Stemra); CBb 19 November 2015, 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:401 (Stichting ’t Hollandsch Huys); CBb 8 oktober 2015, 
ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:314 (Chipshol); CBb 22 December 2015, ECLI:NL:CBB:2015:407 (VVR). 
63
 Nagy (n 59) 194.  
64
 Ibid.; District Court Rotterdam 27 August 2015, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2015:6080 (Buma/Stemra). 
65
 Network Notice (n 4).  
101 and 102 TFEU.66 If an NCA is already acting on a case, the Commission can only initiate 
proceedings after consulting that NCA. Article 11(3), (4) of Regulation 1/2003 obliges NCAs 
to inform the Commission of cases which have an effect on trade between Member States. 
This not only provides information about ongoing cases and envisaged decisions, but also 
gives the Commission the possibility to take over the case under Article 11(6) if it considers 
it necessary. Article 12 addresses the exchange of substantial information about a case 
between the different enforcers.  
Article 16 of the Regulation is also important for the cooperation between the 
Commission and the Member State. According to this article, the national courts and 
competition authorities cannot take a decision regarding Articles 101 or 102 TFEU which 
would run counter to an earlier decision by the Commission concerning the same agreement 
or practice.67 The national courts must also avoid making decisions which would conflict 
with a decision contemplated by the Commission in proceedings it has initiated. To that 
effect, the national court may assess whether it is necessary to stay its proceedings. Article 
16’s objective is the uniform application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In addition, the 
national authorities may ask the Commission to transmit to them information in its possession 
or its opinion on questions concerning the application of the EU competition rules.68 Finally, 
national courts have to send their judgments regarding Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to the 
Commission and the Commission may submit written observations to the national courts 




The rules for cooperation between the Commission and the NCAs and among the NCAs were 
laid down within the legal framework of the ECN which was also established by Regulation 
1/2003. The institutional design of the ECN consists of four different levels. These are 
organised in the form of annual meetings of the Directors General of the European 
Competition Authorities, plenary meetings, horizontal working groups and sector-specific 
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subgroups.70 The ECN has a quasi-hierarchical structure in which the Commission still 
retains a central position. While other European regulatory networks emerged as an initiative 
of the Member States, the ECN was centrally designed and established by the Commission.71  
The two main pillars of the ECN are case allocation and information exchange. The 
rules for case allocation are laid down in the Network Notice.72 Case allocation is based on 
the general principle of minimising the number of authorities involved in a single 
investigation; therefore, the competition authority, which opens the proceedings, remains 
competent to act until the end of the investigation.73 However, reallocation of cases between 
network members is possible when necessary for the effective enforcement of EU 
competition rules. In these cases network members try to allocate the case to a single well-
placed authority as far as possible.74 In order to qualify as well-placed, a ‘material link’ 
between the infringement and the geographical jurisdiction of the authority in question must 
exist.75 The Commission is well placed to initiate proceedings where the alleged violation 
affects competition in more than three Member States, or where a case is closely linked to 
other EU law provisions which may be exclusively or more effectively applied by the 
Commission, if the Union interest requires the adoption of a Commission decision to develop 
EU competition policy when a new competition issue arises or to ensure effective 
enforcement.76 In those cases, the Commission can take over a case from the NCA. However, 
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the Commission cannot take over a case merely for reasons of coherent application.77 Despite 
the foregoing, there are recent examples where the NCAs and the Commission have found it 
more efficient to allocate different aspects of the same case to different authorities or to 
parallel enforcement of one case by multiple NCAs, which is not prohibited by Regulation 
1/2003.78  
Information exchange concerns both information exchange on ongoing cases and 
information exchange on best enforcement practices. The NCAs and the Commission may 
also exchange confidential information; however, there are certain safeguards to such 
information exchange protecting the rights of defence.79 The NCAs and the Commission may 
also assist one another in collection of evidence. While NCAs enjoy a certain degree of 
discretion as to whether or not to assist another NCA, they are obliged to do so with regard to 
the Commission.80 While there are no mechanisms for dispute resolution, the Advisory 
Committee provides a platform for resolving possible disputes.81 The Commission is obliged 
to consult the Advisory Committee before taking a positive decision on Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU and discussions between the Commission and the Advisory Committee may result in 
written opinions that the Commission has to take into account.82 
Although case allocation and information sharing are the main pillars of the ECN, few 
cases have been reallocated83 and sharing information about specific cases has been 
infrequent.84 Hence, shared enforcement between the Commission and Member States is very 
limited. The ECN, in fact, functions more as a forum to discuss enforcement strategies as 
well as for mutual learning and informal information sharing. 
Further details and logistical aspects of the cooperation are not determined by the 
Network Notice but by respective national procedural laws so far as they comply with the 
principles of effectiveness and equivalence.85 In sum, the ECN does not have any 
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autonomous enforcement powers or competences; only the NCAs and the Commission 
possess the powers and competences to apply and enforce the law.  
The ECN has so far been functioning smoothly and successfully,86 and it has been 
praised as an effective ‘joint enterprise’ between the Member States and the Commission. 
However, in practice the Commission still retains a privileged position. It acts as the ‘network 
manager’ with an important capacity for monitoring and oversight.87 Legally, the ECN is not 
an official EU institution, and it does not have any legal personality, as a consequence of 
which this cooperation is not subject to EU or national judicial control. This will be further 
analysed in section 3. 
 
2.4 Interim Conclusion 
 
The above analysis clearly shows that the enforcement of EU competition law is in fact based 
more on parallel enforcement and less on shared enforcement in the true sense of the word. 
This also means that basically once case allocation has taken place the competent and best-
placed competition authority, either one of the 28 NCAs or the Commission, will deal with 
the case on a stand-alone basis. Moreover, while decentralisation was originally based on the 
concept of equality among enforcers, the factors mentioned above confirm the Commission’s 
position as primus inter pares in this enforcement framework. The ECN as such does not 
have its own powers of enforcement and functions more as a forum for policy making. 
 
3. Accountability  
 
The bifurcated nature of the shared enforcement of EU competition law as analysed above 
and, more specifically, the way in which the ECN functions, raise the fundamental question 
of how the actors in the shared enforcement of EU competition law can be held accountable 
for their actions. The question of accountability is even more important in regard to the fact 
that the Commission has an influential role in the enforcement of competition law. The 
Commission performs an important and highly discretionary role in clarifying the EU 
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competition rules and in ensuring consistent application of these rules. The Commission 
drafts numerous soft law documents, such as notices and guidelines, which explain its 
enforcement and provide guidance for undertakings. These instruments are not legally 
binding.88 Nonetheless, they have an important influence on the way competition rules are 
enforced at both the EU and national level. The Dutch courts, for example, regularly refer to 
the Commission’s policy documents in their judgments.89 Another illustration is the GVH’s 
present guidelines for the setting of fines, which largely follow the guidelines of the 
European Commission and give consideration to factors including gravity and duration in the 
calculation of fines. In conclusion, the democratic legitimacy of these soft law instruments is 
questionable and it directly affects the enforcement agenda of the Commission as well as of 
the NCAs. This is worrying as it does shape the substance of EU competition law but without 
having a proper political accountability forum.90 
 
3.1 Political Accountability  
 
Under Article 17 (6) TEU the European Parliament (EP) has the competence to hold the 
Commission politically accountable. The EP has a number of important mechanisms at its 
disposal to this function such as Article 17(7) TEU that defines the strong political 
connection between the composition of the Commission and the EP.91 Under Article 201 
TFEU, the EP can censure the Commission and ultimately dismiss it and the EP has the 
power to set up a temporary Committee of Inquiry to investigate ‘alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Union law’ according to Article 226 TFEU.  
According to Articles 285–287 TFEU, the European Court of Auditors (ECA) as the 
EU's independent external auditor, holds the Commission to account through checking if the 
budget of the EU has been implemented correctly, and that EU funds have been raised and 
spent legally and in accordance with the principles of sound financial management (see 
Chapter 12). The annual reports of the ECA in the last six years mainly focused on 
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procurement rules and state aid rules,92 and do not mention the work done within the ECN. 
By virtue of Article 233 TFEU the Commission and thus DG Competition submits its 
annual reports to the EP, who consequently discusses it and comments on the report in a 
resolution.  
Relations between the EP and the Commission have since 1990 been governed by a 
Framework Agreement, which is updated every five years. In 2010, the EP and the 
Commission concluded the current Framework Agreement, which defines the procedures for 
their political collaboration.93 The Framework Agreement, among others, provides for the 
organisation of regular meetings between representatives of the two institutions.94  
Despite the foregoing, the EP has limited legislative and supervisory powers in 
competition law in comparison with other policies connected to the internal market and the 
Commission is independent and enjoys a high degree of discretion concerning policy 
making.95 Competition law and policy is the only exclusive Union competence in which the 
Parliament’s legislative power is limited to consultation (arts 3 and 103 TFEU).96 
While in principle the EP can hold the Commission accountable for its policy choices, 
effective accountability often proves to be difficult in practice among others, due to 
information asymmetry between the two institutions.97 Due to the technical complexity of 
competition law the Commission functions as a technocratic expert and as such enjoys a high 
degree of independence.98  
A discursive analysis of the EP’s reports, debates and resolutions concerning the 
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Commission’s annual reports on competition policy between 2003 and 2015 clearly reflect 
the EP’s increasing rhetoric for more transparency in the work of the Commission and for a 
more proactive role for the EP in the development of competition policy. The EP has 
repeatedly called for the extension of the co-decision procedure99 so that the EP would have 
co-legislative role. It has also voiced the requirement that the EP be regularly informed about 
any initiative in the shaping of competition policy as such an involvement would create 
greater transparency and legitimacy in EU competition policy. It has also urged the 
Commission to report to Parliament in detail and annually about the follow-up to Parliament's 
recommendations, and explain any departure from Parliament's recommendations.100  
The actual effect of this discourse has, however, been questioned by one MEP in a 
debate in 2011: 
 
It strikes me about these annual debates on competition policy that there is a very 
friendly and polite exchange of views, and then the Commission just carries on 
with business as usual because the Commission has the exclusive powers in this 
area. I think, at a time where we are discussing economic governance for the 
European Union, that should change. The European Parliament should have a 
much bigger role in shaping competition policies, and I therefore urge the 
Commission to follow, in particular, recommendations 3 and 4, and really 
seriously report back to the European Parliament about its recommendations.101 
 
Perhaps as a result of the EP’s dissatisfaction with the Commission’s policy following 
its recommendations, a certain strengthening of the above rhetoric can be witnessed in the 
last three years, for example, by opening separate chapters in the EP resolutions on the role of 
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the EP102 and separately discussing issues of legitimacy and accountability. In 2015, the EP 
even argued that the EP’s lack of co-decision powers in competition policy and its mere 
consultation under Articles 103 and 109 TFEU is a democratic deficit that cannot be tolerated 
and proposed to overcome this deficit through inter-institutional arrangements and correction 
in the next Treaty change.103 The EP has squarely put forward that the Commission must be 
fully accountable and must follow up Parliament’s resolutions and cooperate to reinforce the 
ongoing structured dialogue. It called on the Commissioner to commit to frequent meetings 
with the relevant committee(s) of Parliament. 
The latest EP resolution of 2016 even incorporated a chapter with the title 
‘Democratic strengthening of competition policy’, where the EP argued that while the current 
dialogue between Parliament and the EU competition authority had taken place on a regular 
basis, it should be stepped up, in particular for the purpose of assessing and acting on the 
calls made by Parliament in previous years. It argued that while the independence of the 
Commission’s DG Competition is of the utmost importance if it is to achieve its goals in a 
successful manner, the right to a hearing on essential matters of principle is not sufficient and 
called again for fundamental legislative directives and guidelines to be adopted within the co-
decision procedure.104 It further emphasised that, in its future work, the Commission’s DG 
Competition should take proper account of the standpoints adopted by Parliament in past 
reports on competition policy. 
As this area of Union policy has not been strengthened in its democratic dimension in 
recent Treaty amendments, it called on the Commission to put forward proposals for a 
corresponding amendment to the Treaties to extend the scope of the ordinary legislative 
procedure to cover competition law as well.105 
The NCAs can be held accountable by their national parliaments for their EU 
competition law enforcement. The scope of accountability and the procedures for 
accountability are largely determined by country-specific legislation and the respective legal 
traditions. Even the newly proposed Directive (Article 4) does not add a substantive provision 
on this and merely says that Member States should subject their NCAs to proportionate 
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accountability requirements without defining further details of what these are. The 
accompanying text does however indicate that ‘proportionate accountability requirements 
include the publication by NCAs of periodic reports on their activities to a governmental or 
parliamentary body. NCAs may also be subject to control or monitoring of their financial 
expenditure, provided this does not affect their independence.’106 
 Political accountability of the NCAs should be analysed together with the 
institutional, personal and financial independence, both de facto and de iure107 of the 
competition authority which largely differs across Member States.108  
While the Dutch ACM is an independent administrative authority, the Minister of 
Economic Affairs is responsible for the ACM towards the Dutch Parliament. 109 According to 
the law, the Dutch Parliament does not have a direct relationship with the ACM. The Minister 
and Parliament have however several institutional, personal and financial mechanisms to 
monitor the functioning of the ACM. 
First, the ACM has information obligations towards the Minister of Economic Affairs 
and the responsible Minister vis-à-vis the Parliament. For example, the ACM has to send its 
annual reports, which include policy choices, enforcement activities and costs, to the 
Minister.110 The Minister sends the annual report together with his or her findings to the 
Parliament.111 The Parliament can and did multiple times question the Minister on the annual 
report. In 2016, Members of Parliament questioned the Minister on how the ACM uses its 
powers, which economic theories it applies and about certain policy choices.112 In addition, 
the ACM has a general information obligation towards the Minister at the Minister’s 
request.113 The Parliament can also question the Minister about the functioning of the ACM. 
Finally, the Parliament can ask the Minister to evaluate the ACM’s functioning by an external 
consultancy firm.114  
In practice, when the Parliament questions the Minister about the ACM, the Minister 
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can be accompanied by an ACM representative.115 In this way the ACM can directly explain 
its work to the Dutch Parliament. The ACM does so in hearings, roundtable meetings or 
technical briefings, for example, organised by the various parliamentary committees.116 In the 
Dutch parliamentary debates on the ACM’s annual reports the ECN has not been mentioned 
and no questions were asked about the ACM’s work within the ECN. 
A recent example of a case in which the ACM directly explained its work to the Dutch 
parliament is ‘the Chicken of Tomorrow’ case.117 ‘The Chicken of Tomorrow’ is an 
agreement between supermarkets, producers and processors to replace the regularly produced 
chicken meat by the so-called Chicken of Tomorrow, which is meat from chickens which 
have had better living conditions. The ACM concluded that these agreements restrict 
competition.118 ACM’s analysis and the economic theory used, led to parliamentary 
questions, which gave ACM’s Chairman the chance to explain ACM’s analysis in a 
roundtable meeting organised by the responsible standing committee of the Parliament on 4 
April 2015. The responsible Minister and Secretary of State spoke out publicly that they 
hoped that ACM would reconsider its analysis.119 The ACM did, however, not fulfil this 
request. The Minister lacks the power to force the ACM to do so since the law prohibits him 
from interfering with individual cases which forms an important safeguard protecting ACM’s 
independence in individual cases.120 The supermarkets, producers and processors finally 
withdrew their initiative.  
Secondly, regarding financial mechanisms, the ACM sends a draft budget to the 
Minister every year which the Minister establishes.121 The idea to give the ACM legal 
personality which would limit the Minister’s influence on the budget by giving the ACM the 
competence to ascertain its own budget and give the Minister only the competence to approve 
it was rejected by Parliament.122 The Minister argued that the limitation of his competence 
would be undesirable with regards to his accountability towards the Parliament.123 Literature 
has criticised the rejection in light of ACM’s financial independence.124   
                                                                 
115
 Ibid., 13–14. 
116
 Ibid., 13; Another example is the roundtable meeting about the mergers in the health care sector.  
117
 Analysis ACM, ACM/DM/2014/206028. 
118
 Annual report 2015, 14. 
119
 Reaction Minister Kamp and Secretary of State Dijksma 19 March 2015. 
120
 EEA, art 9. 
121
 FIAA, art 25. 
122
 Parliamentary Papers II 2011/12, 33186, 3, 6–7. See for more information L Schouten and A de 
Moor-van Vugt, ‘De onafhankelijkheid van de Autoriteit Consument en Markt’ (2015) 63 SEW 62. 
123
 Parliamentary Papers I 2012/13, 33186, D, 15. 
124
 Schouten and De Moor-van Vugt (n 123) 69. 
Thirdly, the Minister is involved in appointing the ACM’s board, although the board 
operates independently in practice.125 The Minister has limited competence to dismiss one of 
the board members for, among others reasons, incompetence.126 ACM’s staff is employed by 
the Ministry of Economic Affairs, while, in practice, the ACM hires the employees.127 To 
guarantee independence, Article 9 EAA states that the board and employees of the ACM 
cannot receive any orders regarding individual cases from the responsible Minister. 
In addition to abovementioned factors, three interesting factors influence ACM’s 
decision-making process in individual cases. The first factor is certain targets set for fines 
that were adopted in the coalition agreement of the previous Dutch Government.128 These 
fining targets describe the amount of fines (in Euros) to be imposed by the ACM for cartel 
infringements.129 Many academics criticised these fining targets since they influence ACM’s 
discretion in the enforcement of individual cases.130 The targets for example influence the 
ACM’s competence to set priorities which also includes the decision to not impose a fine or 
to use alternative enforcement instruments and the competence to set the amount of the fine. 
In other words, it negatively affects independent enforcement by the ACM. When Parliament 
questioned the competent Minister about these targets, he argued that the targets do not 
interfere with the independence of the ACM, since if the ACM does not achieve the desired 
targets, this will not affect its budget or have any other consequences.131 Another factor 
which influences the amount of the fines in individual cases is the fact that the guidelines that 
the ACM has to follow in its enforcement of competition law, for example as to the 
calculation of any fines, are drafted by the responsible Minister, restricting ACM’s 
discretion.132 Finally, the Minister has the competence to annul an ultra vires decision of the 
ACM.133  
In conclusion, while the ACM is an independent authority, the Minister and 
Parliament have various instruments to receive information from the ACM and discuss issues 
with the latter. The asymmetries in knowledge and expertise between on the one hand the 
ACM, and on the other hand the Minister, Government and Parliament can make the 
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information exchange and discussion thereof difficult in practice. Instruments to influence the 
enforcement by the ACM are the appointment of ACM’s board, ascertaining ACM’s budget 
and fining targets, drafting ACM’s guidelines and the possibility of annulment of ultra vires 
decisions. Although in particular fining targets and guidelines limit ACM’s discretion of 
handling cases, the non-interference in individual cases should be safeguarded as also 
described in law. De facto, as illustrated by the Chicken of Tomorrow case, the ACM is 
willing to explain and give information about its analysis in individual cases, but will protect 
its monopoly to make decisions. These factors indicate a certain balance between the Minister 
and the ACM in practice and in spite of their relationship of dependence a de facto 
independence of the ACM in individual cases. 
The Hungarian GVH is a budgetary institution and is independent from the 
Government: it cannot be given instructions by any governmental institution but only by 
law.134 The President of the GVH is nominated by the Prime Minister, heard by the 
Hungarian Parliament and is appointed by the President of Hungary. The appointment lasts 
for six years (renewable) and this overlaps with the four-year period of the Government. The 
President of the GVH cannot be dismissed except in specific and very serious circumstances, 
such as for committing a crime or misusing information certified as top secret. The operation 
and financial management of the GVH is completely autonomous and constitutes a separate 
chapter in the central budget. In contrast to the ACM, the GVH is held accountable to the 
Hungarian Parliament. As mentioned above, its President is heard by the Parliament before 
his or her appointment. Moreover, the GVH submits its annual reports to the Parliament and, 
on request, to the competent parliamentary committee on the activities of the GVH. In 
addition, according to the Hungarian Competition Act, the GVH has to publish the non-
confidential versions of all of its decisions and all of its final orders adopted at the conclusion 
of proceedings (the opening of which were made also public). Finally, the National Audit 
Office controls how the GVH uses its financial resources. 
Our analysis of the Hungarian parliamentary debates on the GVH’s annual reports in 
the period 2004–16 reveals a serious ‘backsliding’135 of the accountability mechanisms laid 
down in Hungarian law. The GVH has been publishing and submitting its annual reports ever 
since its creation in 1991 to the Hungarian Parliament,136 where various Committees such as 
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the Economic and Consumer Protection Committees have pre-discussed and commented on 
the reports and the Parliament has held general debates with the participation of the 
representative of various parties. The GVH’s work has been praised and appreciated by the 
MEPS (both government and opposition parties) and they voiced their satisfaction about the 
transparency and accuracy with which the GVH worked and communicated its work to the 
outside world.137 In these debates the ECN has been mentioned twice and the MEPs voiced 
their hope that the GVH’s work would become more efficient through its participation in the 
network.138  
However, when the new President of the GVH was appointed by Government in 
2010, he was not heard by the Parliament before his appointment.139 What is even more 
worrying since 2010 on the one hand, is the fact that a number of areas were excluded from 
the GVH’s competence to enforce the competition rules. This is a direct consequence of a 
change that has been analysed as a shift to a new constitutional culture in Hungary, where the 
law is used to enable the Government to rule and not the rule of law functioning as a restraint 
on Government actions. This shift was perhaps the most visible in practices of economic 
regulation and their constitutional review in Hungary of the new Fundamental Law.140 Since 
2010 the Hungarian Government has radically restructured numerous, well-identifiable 
sectors of the Hungarian economy such as gambling, food and tobacco retail and public 
utilities sector.141 These restructuring processes were characterised by a low degree of 
transparency and a high degree of executive discretion. Moreover, in its assessment of these 
developments, the Hungarian Constitutional Court refused to test Government actions against 
the most fundamental requirements of the rule of law.142 
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On the other hand, the general parliamentary debate as an accountability forum has 
disappeared. The GVH’s 2012 and 2014 and 2015 annual reports were merely discussed by 
one single parliamentary committee.143 This has serious implications for the rule of law 
institutions and values in Hungary, but it may equally impact the enforcement of EU 
competition law.  
Unlike its network members, the ECN itself cannot be held accountable either to the 
EP or the national parliaments. It is only its members that are accountable to their respective 
parliaments, but even in that case not for acts or decisions taken within the ECN e.g. case 
allocation and information exchange. Unlike other EU networks, for example for 
telecommunications, the ECN is under no obligation to publish annual reports and submit 
them to the Commission or the EP. Information on and about the work of the ECN is 
provided through the Commission’s annual report and through its website where the ECN 
publishes a newsletter.144 
The abovementioned analysis of the EP’s debates and resolutions on the Commission 
annual reports reflect a very low level of accountability concerning the ECN. In fact, the EP 
from 2004 on took a positive view of cooperation within the ECN concerning its goal to 
ensure the EU-wide effectiveness and coherence of competition policies and it has supported 
the effective sharing of responsibility between the ECN members,145 arguing that it allows 
EU-wide coherence of public enforcement of competition rules, and encourages its further 
development.146 The EP pointed out that the ECN is a cooperation forum and is essential for 
the strengthening of the consistency and effectiveness of the application of the EC 
competition rules, and urges its members to play an active part in that body and to provide 
impetus for its potential in accordance with the strategic role given to competition policy in 
the EU.147 It has even congratulated the Commission on the steps it has taken in improving 
the functioning of the ECN.148 
The EP merely called the Commission to take measures to optimise the exchange of 
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information among NCAs within the ECN, and to enhance the quality of such information, 
with a view to guaranteeing the uniform application of EU competition policy; and to make 
an effort to promote the correct application of the competition rules in all Member States, and 
to intervene in good time where the competition rules are being applied unsatisfactorily or in 
a discriminatory manner.149 While the EP has clearly voiced its concerns regarding the 
transparency and accountability of the Commission for its work the same concern has not 
been voiced with regard to the ECN. This is surprising in light of the fact that the introduction 
of network governance in general150 and in particular in EU competition law151 has been 
extensively analysed. This analysis clearly demonstrates that networks provide flexibility by 
enabling cooperation among national and Union experts and officials in order to address a 
policy issue but at the same time they carry the risk of producing technical discourses and 
policies that lack the democratic input of citizens and therefore are hazardous to 
accountability forums such as courts and parliaments.152  
Solutions for the above sketched accountability problem in the field of EU 
competition law is scarce. Cengiz argued that multi-level deliberative networks and mini-
publics can directly participate in multi-level policy-making processes and thus remedy the 
accountability deficit present in the network.153  
De Visser suggested that the ECN should also draw up its own annual work 
programme and submit it directly to the EP.154 She also suggested that the law could provide 
for a periodic review of the ECN’s functioning supplemented by deliberation at the 
accountability forum. While parliaments and courts are the traditional forums of 
accountability, external administrative institutions of accountability have recently emerged in 
the form of ombudsmen and audit offices. Similarly, Harlow and Rawlings suggested that 
‘networks of accountability’ be constructed in order to cover the accountability gap in 
supranational networks like the ECN. These would be built up from traditional accountability 
machinery such as courts, parliaments and more recent ones such as ombudsmen and audit 
                                                                 
149
 EP Resolution of 20 March 2006 on the Commission Report on Competition Policy 2004 
(2005/2209(INI)). 
150
 Coen and Thatcher (n 71). 
151




 See also: R Goodin and J Dryzek, ‘Making Use of Mini-Publics’ in R Goodin (ed.), Innovating 
Democracy: Democratic Theory and Practice After the Deliberative Turn  (OUP 2008). 
154
 It is, however, not clear whether the obligation to report directly to the Parliament would only be 
possible if the ECN were to have legal personality like an agency. This may raise additional legal 
issues. M de Visser, Network-based Governance in Commission Law – The Example of Commission 
Competition and Commission Communications Law (Hart Publishing 2009) 265. 
offices.155 
The above analysis shows that political accountability merely exists at the level of the 
members of the ECN and the ECN itself is not held accountable. What is more, the 
accountability forums as established at EU and national level fail to even question either the 
Commission or the respective NCAs on their work within the ECN. On the basis of our case 
studies and concerning the Commission we think that the EU and national parliaments may 
simply lack adequate information about the work of the ECN and therefore, may not be aware 
of the existing accountability gap. Both the Commission and the NCAs have a knowledge 
advantage vis-à-vis their national parliaments. Moreover, there is a risk that the NCAs hide 
behind the European Commission and the general EU law principle of sincere cooperation 
and justify their work in the ECN and state that they need to follow certain policies choices to 
serve the uniform enforcement of EU competition law. 
 
3.2 Judicial Accountability  
 
As far as the judicial accountability of the Commission is concerned, the undertaking can file 
an appeal at the General Court as the first instance court and the CJEU as the second instance 
court.156 The General Court reviews questions of facts and law, but the CJEU’s review is 
limited to questions of law.157 According to Article 31 Regulation 1/2003, the EU Courts may 
cancel, reduce or increase the fines. The standard of the review by the EU Courts varies from 
an intensive review regarding, among others, the establishment of the facts and the 
interpretation of the law,158 to a marginal review on areas in which the Commission has 
discretion, such as policy matters and complex economic assessment.159 The intensity of the 
judicial review on the point of complex economic analysis has been extensively discussed in 
the legal literature.160 Lavrijssen and De Visser’s analysis on the intensity of review pictured 
it as a sliding scale ranging from the extremely marginal review on the one hand to a very 
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intensive review on the other hand. 161 The form and intensity of judicial reviews is even more 
relevant in light of the increasing use of settlements and commitment decisions that greatly 
influence judicial accountability. The Commission has settled in almost 70 per cent of cases 
since 2010.162 The use of settlements by the Commission or the NCAs plays an important role 
in relation to judicial accountability. Research by Hellwig et al. showed that the use of 
settlements lowers the percentage of litigation.163 The percentage of litigation is around 60 
per cent for average cartel cases, while the undertakings filed appeals in only 10.5 per cent of 
the settled cases.164 In addition, the grounds of appeal are limited since the undertaking 
among others has already acknowledged the facts and the qualification of them and has 
accepted the amount of the fine.165  
These changes resulted on the one hand in more efficiency and flexibility in the 
Commission’s enforcement (e.g. more frequent use of settlements and commitment 
decisions) but, on the other hand, they have moved the administrative enforcement system of 
the EU towards a regulatory enforcement system through giving more discretion to the 
Commission and reducing the room for judicial review and accountability before the EU 
Courts. 
The level of judicial protection differs greatly across the Member States. This is the 
result of their procedural autonomy, which allows for differences in the type and number of 
courts, expertise of the judiciary, burden and standard of proof during court procedures, and 
time limits. These factors influence the level of judicial protection. The fining decision of the 
ACM can be appealed by the undertaking fined at two different levels of exclusive competent 
courts which both review questions of law and facts.166 Both courts conduct an intensive 
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review of all aspects of the fining decisions.167 The Dutch level of judicial protection can thus 
be considered as high, as a consequence of the full review of questions of law and fact by the 
two specialised courts, and the fact that the ACM bears the burden of proof. The ACM fining 
decisions for cartel cases are also often annulled by those courts.168 In the case of an 
annulment, the Dutch court has the obligation to rule independently whether a fine can be 
imposed and what the amount of the fine should be.169 
Decisions of the GVH are subject to judicial review at three different levels of courts 
that all review questions of law and facts. The final court is the Hungarian Supreme Court, 
and ultimately, after those three court procedures, the parties may file a constitutional 
complaint with the Hungarian Constitutional Court. The standard of review in administrative 
procedural law is that of ‘legality’.170 In Hungarian law, judicial review of the legality of 
administrative decisions covers breaches of both procedural and substantive law, while it 
excludes the review of the merits of the administrative decision taken under direct statutory 
or discretionary powers. The division between the review of legality and the review of merits 
is, however, not always clear in Hungarian law.171  
While Article 6 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) on the right to a fair 
trial in a reasonable time should, in principle, have had an important influence in Hungary, 
this was not the case in procedures involving the GVH. Hungarian court proceedings in 
judicial review have consistently refused to apply Articles 6 and 8 ECHR, even though 
undertakings almost always invoked the quasi-criminal nature of the proceedings in judicial 
review against the GVH’s decisions.172 However, more recently both the Hungarian 
Constitutional Court and the Hungarian Supreme Court have acknowledged that cartel 
proceedings are quasi-criminal proceedings requiring special guarantees.173 Hungarian courts 
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are thus competent to fully review the GVH’s cartel decisions and to substitute the GVH’s 
decision with their own, for example, to reduce the fines imposed by the GVH. In 2015, the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court also investigated how certain procedural guarantees should 
apply in cartel proceedings.174 Another problem with Hungarian administrative courts is that 
they fail to recognise economic interests, even the interests of competitors in competition 
cases, as direct legitimate interests capable of securing standing in judicial review. 
In light of these significant differences among Member States as to the level of 
judicial protection, it can make a remarkable difference for an undertaking as to which 
Member State investigates the case and enforces the competition rules. In this respect it is 
problematic that the decision to allocate cases to one or other Member State cannot be 
appealed. As mentioned above, while case allocation is a core function of the ECN, the ECN 
lacks legal personality and thus no judicial control takes place by either the national or the 
EU judiciary as the General Court has confirmed.175 This leaves fundamental questions of 
jurisdiction and, more importantly, the question by whom and how the ECN can be held 
accountable, unanswered.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
EU competition law is enforced in a system where NCAs and the Commission act in parallel 
rather than sharing the enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. These competition rules 
can be enforced by a single NCA with or without the assistance of authorities from other 
Member States, by several NCAs acting in parallel, or by the Commission. Rules for case 
allocation and close cooperation are laid down in the framework of the ECN in order to 
achieve uniform and consistent application of Articles 101 and 102. The ECN’s two main 
functions are allocating cases and exchanging information. The ECN has neither a legal 
personality nor autonomous powers of enforcement. It is its members who, on the basis of 
EU and national laws, enforce the competition law provisions of the Treaty. As such, these 
members can be held accountable for their respective enforcement actions. Both the 
Commission and the NCAs are politically accountable to the EP and national parliaments 
respectively. Our analysis shows, first, that the ECN is not held accountable at either by the 
EU or the national parliaments, and second, that political accountability differs across 
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Member States and be even seriously undermined in practice. 
Likewise, it is the members of the ECN that are separately held accountable by the EU 
and national courts. In theory the EU Courts comply with the principle of effective judicial 
protection and conduct a comprehensive review, although the deferential review pertaining to 
complex economic assessments by the Commission has been criticised by different authors. 
In addition, judicial accountability is limited by certain developments such as the use of 
settlements. The level of judicial protection among the Member States differs and depends on 
procedural rules, such as the burden and standard of proof, the expertise of the judiciary and 
the scope and intensity of the review. In light of these significant differences among Member 
States as to the level of judicial protection, it can make a significant difference for an 
undertaking and have a relevant impact on the protection of their rights of defence, as to 
which Member State enforces the alleged infringement. In this respect it is problematic that 
the decision (or no decision) on case allocation and on information exchange is not subject to 
either political or judicial control.  
It is this aspect of the shared enforcement of EU competition law that is in need of 
reassessment. There is also a need for a composite accountability mechanism which is based 
on similar network governance such as the Network of National Ombudsmen. 
 
